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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2013, Americans were stunned to discover that the 
government was spying on their Internet activities.1  Edward 
Snowden, a former National Security Administration (NSA) 
contractor,2 initially revealed to The Guardian, a national British 
daily newspaper, that the NSA was using a program called Prism to 
gain access to Americans’ emails and online data through their 
Internet service providers (ISPs).3  Specifically, the NSA was using 
																																																																																																																																
 1. See Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He 
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillance-data.html; Charlie 
Savage et al., U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, June 
6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html. 
 2. See Mazzetti & Schmidt, supra note 1. 
 3. See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to 
User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN, June 7, 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.  The Prism 
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this program to tap into the central servers of several leading U.S. 
Internet companies, extracting private audio and video chats, 
photographs, e-mails and other documents stored online.4 
While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),5 which 
allows the NSA to conduct surveillance on matters of foreign 
intelligence,6 is the statute at the heart of the scandal, the debate that 
the scandal has generated about government surveillance also draws 
attention to problems in our domestic surveillance laws.  Our 
domestic surveillance laws, which exist both on the federal and state 
level, provide for government surveillance of American citizens by 
law enforcement officials.  The current legal framework, enacted on 
the federal level and copied in many states, is significantly outdated 
and therefore woefully inadequate to protect Americans’ privacy in 
modern communications like email and text messaging. 
Specifically, the current federal statute, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)7 was enacted in 1986, when the 
Internet was still in its infancy.8  As a result, protection of stored e-
mail and text messages is so weak today that government officials are 
often able to access thousands of these private communications 
without a showing of probable cause.9  This weakness is true on the 
federal level and in many states.  This Note focuses on New York’s 
surveillance framework, which tracks the ECPA, pointing out 
weaknesses in New York’s framework with respect to government 
access to stored electronic communications like text-messages and 
emails. 
																																																																																																																																
program allows the NSA to collect the communications of users of these ISPs.  Under 
the governing law, the NSA can gain access to accounts of users who live outside the 
United States.  The NSA can also access the accounts of Americans whose 
communications include people outside the United States. 
 4. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data 
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-
from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-
11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html. 
 5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 (Supp. 2011). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12, 
3121–27 (2012). 
 8. See generally William Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195 (2010). 
 9. See generally United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
Specifically, the Stored Communications Act allows government access to certain 
stored electronic communications if the government simply procures a court order or 
subpoena. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
1410 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
Given the growing prevalence of and reliance upon these modes of 
communication, government access to these messages upon such a 
low showing is troubling to say the least.  In fact, today many 
Americans prefer to communicate via email or text message over 
other communication mediums.  Specifically, one recent study found 
that young adults connect just as often through electronic 
communications as they do in-person.10  Similarly, in 2011 thirty-one 
percent of text message users stated that they preferred texting to 
speaking on the phone.11  The irony of these statistics is that 
Americans’ in-person conversations or telephone conversations are 
much more protected from government intrusion than electronic 
communications.12  Even though Americans are beginning to use 
electronic modes of communication more often and to convey the 
same information as they have traditionally conveyed in-person or via 
telephone, those electronic messages are more vulnerable to 
government surveillance. 
At this point, many readers might respond, “So what? If the 
government has to read my emails or texts in order to prevent acts of 
violence or terrorism, that’s ok with me. I have nothing to hide. I will 
gladly surrender my privacy if it means that Americans are safe.”  
These readers are not wrong.  It is about balance. It is about 
determining when the government can violate an individual’s privacy 
rights in order to prevent and investigate crime.  The current legal 
framework fails to strike the right balance.  The following examples 
will demonstrate the dangers posed by the law’s weaknesses.13 
Joe Smith is an upstanding citizen and pillar of his community.  He 
is married to a well-respected woman and is a father to three children.  
Unfortunately, Joe’s brother, Dave, has gotten mixed up in organized 
crime.  Dave had agreed to be a witness for the prosecution in an 
upcoming trial against a mob boss but has since disappeared.  The 
prosecution is desperate to find him.  Convinced that he ran away and 
that his brother is sure to have knowledge of his whereabouts, the 
government gets a court order to search Joe’s emails and text 
messages.  The messages do not reveal any information about Dave’s 
location but they do reveal a series of explicit exchanges between Joe 
																																																																																																																																
 10. See generally JON D. MILLER, UNIV. OF MICH., THE GENERATION X REPORT 
(2013). 
 11. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT MESSAGING 1 (2011). 
 12. See infra Part I.C. and Part I.D. 
 13. These examples are hypothetical, created by the author for the purpose of 
demonstrating potential situations where the failings in the law could have real-life 
consequences for innocent individuals. 
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and several women.  Still convinced that Joe knows the location of a 
vital witness, the prosecution approaches him with their new 
information, threatening to expose the affair if Joe does not 
cooperate with the prosecution. 
Additionally, consider Amy Miller.  Amy is a single woman in her 
late twenties living in a small town.  Amy is schizophrenic. She has 
been on medication for years without an episode and prefers that her 
community not know of her condition. The head of the company 
where Amy works is suspected of embezzlement.  Investigators, for 
one reason or another, believe that Amy may have had knowledge of 
her boss’s actions or even know what he did with the money.  So local 
law enforcement officials, many of whom Amy knows and considers 
friends, get a court order for her emails and texts. The messages 
reveal that Amy has schizophrenia, and soon the whole town knows 
about her mental illness. 
One final example14 is Michael Williams.  Michael is a young 
married man with a promising future.  Michael is also Muslim-
American.  State police and the FBI have been conducting 
surveillance of Muslim individuals in his community ever since 
September 11, 2001. Their primary source of information is 
informants stationed within the Muslim communities.  Investigators 
obtain a court order or subpoena to access Michael’s emails and texts.  
They discover a number of pornographic messages and images 
exchanged between Michael and his wife before their marriage.  If 
exposed, these actions would destroy Michael’s reputation in the 
Muslim community.  Investigators then use this information to force 
Michael to inform on the Muslim community. 
In each of these hypothetical examples, government officials did 
not have to demonstrate probable cause to obtain the users’ private 
electronic correspondence.  Joe’s emails and texts were searched 
without a showing that law enforcement had probable cause to 
believe that Joe had any knowledge of his brother’s whereabouts.  
Amy’s messages were turned over despite the fact that law 
enforcement could not demonstrate probable cause that she had any 
knowledge of her boss’s actions.  And finally, Michael’s messages 
																																																																																																																																
 14. This example is loosely based on a recent news story. See Alastair Jamieson, 
Report: NSA Spied on Porn Habits to Discredit Muslim Radicals, NBC NEWS (Nov. 
27, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/27/21637011-report-nsa-spied-
on-porn-habits-to-discredit-muslim-radicals?lite.  For an in-depth look at the use of 
informants by local and federal law enforcement officials in their investigations of 
Muslim communities, see generally MATT APUZZO & ADAM GOLDMAN, ENEMIES 
WITHIN: INSIDE THE NYPD’S SECRET SPYING UNIT AND BIN LADEN’S FINAL PLOT 
AGAINST AMERICA (2013). 
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were searched without any showing at all that his private information 
was related to an existing criminal investigation other than his status 
as a Muslim.  Moreover, while law enforcement’s use of these 
messages to force cooperation may verge on prosecutorial 
misconduct, the intrusion itself—the reading of the private 
information—is where the harm begins.  These hypothetical examples 
highlight the fact that many Americans today communicate very 
private information via email and text message.  Thus, government 
access to these private communications, even without any misuse of 
the information, is wrong.  The intrusion upon individual privacy 
rights represented by government access to these communications has 
grown as society’s reliance upon electronic communication has 
increased. 
So what can be done to protect electronic communications?  There 
seem to be two options: (1) the states can wait for guidance from the 
federal government via Congress or the courts, and in the meantime 
continue to allow the search of citizens’ stored electronic messages 
without a warrant; or (2) the state legislatures can take action.  Given 
that Congress has failed to enact an amendment to the ECPA despite 
the fact that an amendment has been proposed in each of the last 
three Congressional sessions,15 the first option could leave Americans’ 
privacy rights unprotected for a long time.  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court has failed to provide guidance16 and the lower courts are 
churning out conflicting opinions that rely on outdated distinctions.17  
																																																																																																																																
 15. A bill to amend the Electronic Communications Privacy Act was introduced 
in Congress in each of the last three years.  This year’s attempt is still pending in both 
the House and Senate. See H.R. 2471 (112th), GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2471 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) 
(showing that the 2011 bill died in the Senate after passing in the House).  Another 
bill was introduced in the House in 2012 but died in committee. See also H.R. 6339 
(112th): Electronic Communications Privacy Act Modernization Act of 2012, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6339 (last visited Mar. 
15, 2014).  There is also a bill to amend the ECPA currently before the Senate, 
however it has been stalled since April 25, 2013. See S. 607: Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s607 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 16. See generally City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) (deciding the 
case purely on a reasonableness inquiry instead of the Fourth Amendment question).  
The Supreme Court declined to review a decision about protections for stored email 
messages in 2013. See Jennings v. Broome, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (denying 
certiorari). 
 17. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing on 
procedural grounds a prior decision that held emails were protected under the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
monitoring of non-content information stored with electronic communication service 
provider did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
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The second option, on the other hand, would offer Americans 
protections by their states,18 and may also pressure Congress to take 
action on the federal level.  States can take action by enacting more 
protective legislation, whether that be in the form of an amendment 
of an already existing surveillance statute or whether that involves 
passing a new piece of legislation providing for the protection of 
electronic communications.  In fact, the Texas state legislature 
recently took action to protect its citizens and amended its 
surveillance statute to implement a warrant requirement for all stored 
electronic communications.19 
This Note argues that New York should follow Texas’s lead and 
update its eavesdropping statute.  In fact, a recent discrepancy 
between the plain language of New York’s surveillance statute20 and 
the state courts’ interpretation of the statute21 presents the legislature 
with the perfect opportunity to reconsider the statute’s treatment of 
stored electronic communications as discussed in Part II. 
Specifically, this Note recommends that New York’s eavesdropping 
law be revised to require that state law enforcement officials procure 
a search warrant before they search an individual’s stored electronic 
communications such as emails and texts.  This Note demonstrates 
that this solution is the best way to strike the correct balance between 
individual privacy rights and law enforcement efficacy. 
Part I of this Note provides background information on the law of 
eavesdropping generally.  It also discusses New York’s eavesdropping 
law and the current federal legal framework.  Part II examines the 
conflict in New York between the plain language of New York’s 
eavesdropping statute and the courts’ interpretation of New York’s 
eavesdropping statute.  Part III advocates for the elimination of 
stored electronic communications from the eavesdropping statute.  It 
further proposes that law enforcement access to these 
communications should require a search warrant under New York 
law.  Finally, Part IV suggests specific revisions to New York’s law to 
effect this Note’s suggestions. 
																																																																																																																																
 18. State statutes will not protect their citizens from electronic surveillance from 
federal law enforcement officials. 
 19. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2013); Bob Sullivan, Don’t 
Mess With Texas Email: State Law Ends Some Warrantless Email Searches, NBC 
NEWS (June 18, 2013), http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/18/19025074-dont-
mess-with-texas-email-state-law-ends-some-warrantless-email-searches?lite. 
 20. N.Y. PENAL LAW §250.00(6) (McKinney 2013) (defining “intercepting or 
accessing of an electronic communication”). 
 21. See Gurevich v. Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Moore v. Moore, 
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2008, at 26; Boudakian v. Boudakian, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 2008. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
This Part provides background information on eavesdropping laws 
generally.  Part I.A explains what the term “eavesdropping” means, 
why it is generally prohibited and why we allow government officials 
to eavesdrop under limited circumstances.  Part I.B explores the 
technical process of sending email and text messages in order to 
provide background information necessary to understanding the 
distinctions made in the federal framework.  Part I.C discusses the 
federal framework, emphasizing the various distinctions that the law 
makes with respect to electronic communications.  This discussion is 
important to understand the New York courts’ interpretation of the 
statute and the nature of the debate over the treatment of electronic 
communications.  Finally, Part I.D lays out New York’s 
eavesdropping law.  It describes the process of procuring an 
eavesdropping warrant in New York, including a discussion of the 
showings required by law enforcement in order to obtain the contents 
of communications. 
A. What Is Eavesdropping? 
Blackstone defines eavesdroppers those who “listen under walls or 
windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse.”22  
While eavesdropping methods are much more sophisticated today 
than in Blackstone’s time, the basic concept is the same: 
eavesdropping is the act of listening in on a person’s personal 
communications, often unbeknownst to the speaker.  And while 
private individuals are certainly capable of eavesdropping, the 
government is often the biggest perpetrator of all, as recent events 
have demonstrated.23 
Both state24 and federal laws25 generally prohibit eavesdropping.  
Nevertheless, the government is allowed to eavesdrop under specific 
circumstances if it meets certain legal thresholds under the applicable 
law.  Specifically, the federal framework26 contains three different 
levels of protection, each requiring the government to meet a distinct 
legal threshold.  The highest standard is an eavesdropping warrant.  
																																																																																																																																
 22. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 169 (1769). 
 23. See Mazzetti & Schmidt, supra note 1; Savage et al., supra note 1. 
 24. For example, this Note deals with the New York eavesdropping framework 
contained in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2013) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§§ 700.05–.70 (McKinney 2013). 
 25. The controlling federal law is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12, 3121–27 (2012). 
 26. See id. 
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Communications requiring an eavesdropping warrant are considered 
to have the greatest privacy interests at stake and are therefore 
awarded the most protection.27  The next standard requires law 
enforcement to obtain a search warrant before they are given access 
to certain communications.28  Finally, the lowest standard requires law 
enforcement officials to merely obtain an administrative subpoena or 
court order.  If law enforcement officials meet the requisite legal 
standard, they are permitted to intercept or access these 
communications.  These standards are mirrored in New York’s 
surveillance law, as discussed in greater depth below.29 
The varying standards represent the balance struck between law 
enforcement’s interests and individuals’ privacy interests.30  Advances 
in communications technology often and easily disrupt this delicate 
balance.  If eavesdropping laws fail to keep up with these advances, 
and the delicate balance is upset, there is potential for serious 
consequences, both for individual civil liberties and law enforcement.  
The growing prevalence of electronic communications like email and 
text messaging is one such advance in technology whose outdated 
treatment under the law of eavesdropping has upset this fragile 
balance.31 
																																																																																																																																
 27. See Orin Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big 
Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2003).  These thresholds range from 
least protective (no legal process or subpoena) to a high level of protection 
(eavesdropping warrant). See id. 
 28. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). 
 29. See infra Part I.C. 
 30. In fact, Congress recognized the need for this balance when they enacted the 
ECPA stating that the goal of the ECPA was twofold: to preserve “a fair balance 
between the privacy expectations of citizens and the legitimate needs of law 
enforcement.” H.R. REP. NO. 99–647, at 19 (1986). 
 31. See generally Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment 
Protection for Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121; Orin S. Kerr, Applying the 
Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005 
(2010); Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic 
Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004); Katharine M. O’Connor, :0 OMG They 
Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 685; Alexander Scolnik, Protections for Electronic Communications: The 
Stored Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349 
(2009); Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us From Big Brother? The Need for 
Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 
547 (2003). 
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B. What Are “Stored Electronic Communications”? 
This Note is primarily concerned with two types of electronic 
communications—email messages and text messages—and their 
treatment under New York’s eavesdropping law.32  To understand the 
distinctions the New York courts (and the ECPA) have made with 
respect to these communications, it is important to understand the 
mechanics of their transmission. 
The nature of email has changed significantly over the last few 
decades.  When Congress first passed the ECPA in 1986, web-based 
email systems like Gmail and Yahoo!Mail did not yet exist.33  Instead, 
email primarily existed in local intranets where users would download 
their messages from a server to their own computer.34  Copies of email 
messages already received and read would then remain on the 
individual’s computer rather than on a remote server.35 
Today, many email services are web-based.36  Emails are sent using 
a collection of computer servers operated by ISPs that work together 
and function as a single system.37  Each ISP has the task of running 
applications and storing data in small pieces before it passes that data 
on to the next server in line.38  After a user composes and sends an 
email, the message is broken up into small packets and distributed, 
stored, and transported among different servers until they are 
reconfigured with the recipient.  Once the messages are received, they 
are stored in remote storage on the service provider’s server.39  So 
instead of subscribing to a network like America Online and 
downloading emails from that network’s server onto a personal 
computer, today’s web-based email systems store received emails on a 
remote ISP server.40 
Text messages go through a similar process.  Cellular phones that 
are enabled for text messaging contain Short Message Service (SMS) 
																																																																																																																																
 32. For a more in-depth discussion of email technology and its interplay with the 
SCA, see Courtney Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak: Fourth Amendment 
Protections for E-Mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809, 815–16 (2012). 
 33. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1197–98. 
 34. See id. at 1198. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 1199 (defining “cloud computing” as “the ability to run applications 
and store data on a service provider’s computers over the Internet, rather than on a 
person’s desktop computer”); see also Bowman, supra note 32, at 815–16. 
 37. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1200. 
 38. See id. See also Bowman, supra note 32, at 815–16. 
 39. See Robison, supra note 8, at 1200; Bowman, supra note 32, at 815–16. 
 40. This evolution to web-based e-mail, in which e-mails are stored with an ISP, is 
significant to the discussion of the third party doctrine infra Part III. 
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technology.41  After a sender enters a message into his phone and 
sends it, the message is transmitted to a Short Message Center 
(SMC), where it is temporarily stored.42  The SMC then sends the 
message to the recipient’s mobile device.43  If the receiving phone is 
unavailable, the SMC queues the message and attempts to send it 
again.44  A sent message can be stored in both the sender’s phone and 
the recipient’s phone.45  The message will remain on these devices 
until a user manually deletes it or it deletes automatically to make 
room for new messages.46  The service provider also stores copies of 
the messages on its server.47 
Thus, email and text messages go through varying stages of 
transition, reception and storage.  Under the current federal 
framework, as discussed in Part I.C., the standard that law 
enforcement officials have to meet differs depending on what stage 
the messages are in. 
C. The Federal Framework 
New York courts have interpreted the State’s eavesdropping 
statute to reflect the federal framework’s distinction between 
electronic communications that are in-transit and electronic 
communications that are in storage.  This Subpart will explore the 
federal framework, as an understanding of this distinction is necessary 
to understand the New York courts’ position. 
On the federal level, the ECPA48 governs federal law 
enforcement’s access to a person’s personal electronic 
communications.49  Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986 to expand 
and revise Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act (Title III).50  Specifically, the ECPA extended some of the 
																																																																																																																																
 41. See O’Connor, supra note 31, at 688.  This Note does not discuss law 
enforcement access to texts via cell phones.  Instead, this Note is concerned with the 
procurement of copies of texts from service providers. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12, 
3121–27 (2012). 
 49. The ECPA should not be confused with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA), which establishes a separate legal regime for “foreign intelligence” 
surveillance. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–85 (Supp. 2011).  The ECPA outlines guidelines 
regulating ordinary law enforcement surveillance within the United States. 
 50. See Scolnik, supra note 31, at 375. 
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protections of Title III to electronic communications.51  The ECPA 
created several distinctions for electronic communications based on 
the kind of information sought and the stage of transmission, as 
discussed below. 
The ECPA is composed of three parts: (1) the Wiretap Act;52 (2) 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA);53 and (3) the Pen Register 
Act.54  Generally, the Wiretap Act governs the interception of “wire,” 
“oral,” and “electronic” communications that are in-transit.55  The 
SCA governs access to communications that have been received and 
stored, like stored voicemail messages, emails and text messages.56  
Finally, the Pen Register Act regulates the use of pen registers trap 
and trace devices. Trap and trace devices and pen registers identify 
the phone number of an incoming call or the outgoing phone numbers 
of calls placed from a particular phone, respectively. 57 
1. The Wiretap Act 
The Wiretap Act governs law enforcement access to 
communications while those communications are still in transmission.  
Specifically, the Wiretap Act prohibits any person from intentionally 
intercepting any wire, oral or electronic communication.58  Therefore, 
an interception is only a violation of the Wiretap Act if the 
communication fits into one of three categories.  A “wire 
communication” is a conversation that takes place via telephone.59  
An “oral communication” is a face-to-face conversation in which the 
speakers have a reasonable expectation of privacy.60  “Electronic 
communications” encompass communication via computer, including 
data transmission.61  In effect, any conversation, either over the phone 
																																																																																																																																
 51. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the 
Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 41–42 (2004). 
 52. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012). 
 53. Id. §§ 2701–12. 
 54. Id. §§ 3121–27.  This Note is primarily concerned with the Wiretap Act and 
the Stored Communications Act, as these two statutes govern law enforcement access 
to electronic communications like e-mails and text-messages. 
 55. §§ 2510–22. 
 56. §§ 2701–12. 
 57. See GINA STEVENS & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-327, 
PRIVACY: AN ABBREVIATED OUTLINE OF FEDERAL STATUTES GOVERNING 
WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING 46 (2012).  This Note focuses on 
electronic communications and therefore, the Pen Register Act will not be analyzed. 
 58. § 2511(1). 
 59. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 57, at 12. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id. 
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or in person, or any electronic communication that has not yet been 
received by the recipient, falls within the Wiretap Act.  The 
prohibited interception is limited to the contents of these 
communications as opposed to non-content information like the 
caller or receiver’s phone numbers.62 
Government officials are exempt from the prohibitions against 
interception contained in the Wiretap Act when they procure an 
eavesdropping warrant,63 or when they get the consent of one of the 
parties to the communication.64  Obtaining an eavesdropping warrant 
requires law enforcement officials to meet the highest legal standard 
under the ECPA.65  Thus, the Wiretap Act protects these in-transit 
communications above all others.  The Wiretap Act also requires that 
state wiretapping laws be at least as protective as the federal law or 
risk invalidation under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.66  
Therefore, New York, in considering a revision to its eavesdropping 
laws, must continue to require state law enforcement officials to 
obtain an eavesdropping warrant for the interception of wire, oral or 
electronic communications that are in-transit,67 as discussed in Part 
IV. 
																																																																																																																																
 62. The Wiretap Act defines “contents” as “any information concerning the 
substance, purport or meaning of that communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012).  
The SCA allows the government to obtain non-content basic subscriber information 
with a subpoena.  Basic subscriber information includes the subscriber’s name, 
address, and telephone number. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1208, 1219–20 (2004). 
 63. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–18 (2012); STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 57, at 23.  To 
obtain an eavesdropping warrant, the attorney general, or someone authorized to act 
in his absence must file an application to an authorized judge.  The application must 
include the identity of the officer, a full and complete statement of facts, a statement 
detailing other investigative procedures that have been tried and failed, a statement 
detailing the period of time required for the interception and a statement detailing 
previous applications for interception involving the same persons. See § 2518(1). 
 64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2012). 
 65. See § 2518(3); see also infra Part I.D.1. 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).  In other words, state statutes 
must require an eavesdropping warrant for those electronic communications that are 
in-transit because the Wiretap Act requires it. 
 67. See supra Part III.B.3.  However, the Wiretap Act does not require an 
eavesdropping warrant for stored electronic communications. See Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).  Therefore, if New York’s 
eavesdropping statute was revised to exclude stored electronic communications, that 
revision would satisfy the minimum federal constitutional criteria established by the 
Wiretap Act. See § 2516(2).  However, any revision to exclude electronic 
communications altogether from the reach of the eavesdropping statute, thus 
eliminating the in-transit-versus-stored distinction, would violate the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
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If a communication is not in-transit but instead has already been 
received and/or stored by the recipient, its treatment will be 
determined under the Stored Communications Act (SCA). 
2. The Stored Communications Act 
The SCA governs law enforcement access to electronic 
communications that are stored with a service provider.68  The SCA 
prohibits law enforcement from intentionally accessing a service 
provider’s facility without authorization in order to access a wire or 
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.69  Under 
the SCA, “service providers” would include SMCs and ISPs, as 
discussed above.70  The SCA prohibits accessing the contents of stored 
text messages and emails in the records of these providers. 
Just like the Wiretap Act, the SCA provides an exemption for law 
enforcement.71  Law enforcement officials may compel service 
providers to produce copies of electronic communications that are 
stored on their server if they meet certain requirements under the 
SCA.  As shown in the following paragraphs, the SCA is generally 
much less protective of these communications than the Wiretap Act. 
The SCA creates several distinctions that determine what showing 
law enforcement officials must make to obtain access to stored 
communications.72  First, the SCA distinguishes between two types of 
providers: what the SCA calls “Electronic Communication Service” 
(ECS) providers and “Remote Computing Service” (RCS) 
providers.73  An ECS can hold content in “electronic storage” which is 
defined as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or 
electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission.”74  
																																																																																																																																
 68. See STEVENS & DOYLE, supra note 57, at 35.  The SCA defines “electronic 
storage” as “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and any storage of 
such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup 
protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2012).  Courts have 
concluded that law enforcement access to stored text messages is governed by the 
SCA. See United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 69. See § 2701(a). 
 70. See supra Part I.B. 
 71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
 72. This Note focuses on the distinctions made with respect to ECS and RCS 
providers, and those messages that have been stored for more than 180 days and 
those that have been stored for less than 180 days.  For a more thorough exploration 
of the SCA, see Kerr, supra note 62. 
 73. See § 2703. 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) (2012). 
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For example, a message that sits in an email inbox after transmission 
but before the user retrieves or reads the message is an example of 
ECS “electronic storage.”75  Additionally, any time that a message is 
stored intermediately on its way to the recipient, that provider is 
considered an ECS provider under the SCA.76 
Regarding RCS providers, the SCA defines RCS as “the provision 
to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of 
an electronic communication system.”77  Files held in long-term 
storage after reception are protected under the rules for RCS 
providers.78  Sometimes a provider can be considered a provider of 
both an RCS and an ECS, depending on the status of the particular 
communication that is the subject of the search.79  In this way, the 
inquiry focuses on the provider’s role with respect to a particular 
communication.80  One specific provider, therefore, may be a provider 
of ECS with respect to a certain communication or a provider of RCS 
with respect to another communication.81 
If a provider is an ECS provider then the SCA creates a second 
distinction between those messages stored with an ECS provider for 
more than 180 days and those stored with an ECS provider for less 
than 180 days.82  If the communication is held in storage with an ECS 
provider for less than 180 days, the government needs a search 
warrant in order to compel the provider to disclose it.83  If the 
communication is in ECS storage for more than 180 days, the 
government may compel the provider to disclose it with a subpoena 
or court order.84  If a communication is stored with an RCS, the 
government will also only need a subpoena or court order to compel 
the provider to disclose it, regardless of how long it has been in 
storage.85 
																																																																																																																																
 75. See Fred Kemper, Compulsion of Text Messages After Quon: Applying Old 
Law to New Technology, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2012). 
 76. See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1216. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2012). 
 78. See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1216. 
 79. See id. at 1215–16. 
 80. See id. at 1215. 
 81. See id. at 1215–16. 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012). 
 83. Id. 
 84. § 2703(a)–(b), (d). 
 85. § 2703(b).  Government officials can use a court order or subpoena only if 
they also give the user prior notice. See id.  To obtain a § 2703 court order, the 
government must provide “specific and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe” that the information to be compelled is “relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” § 2703(d). 
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To see how these distinctions play out in practice, it may be helpful 
to return to the Joe Smith example.  Under the SCA, law 
enforcement officials could access any of Joe’s unopened emails or 
text messages that are on his ISP or SMC’s servers for less than 180 
days only with a search warrant.86  However, if Joe’s messages are 
unopened and stored on a server for more than 180 days, or opened 
at all (regardless of time stored) law enforcement agents can compel 
disclosure from Joe’s service providers with a court order or a 
subpoena.87 
Therefore, the Wiretap Act and the SCA create different regimes 
depending on whether the electronic communication sought is in-
transit or is in storage.  The Wiretap Act offers greater protection for 
electronic communications that are in-transit, while the SCA’s 
distinctions based on the type of provider being used and the status of 
the message (opened, un-opened etc.) allow law enforcement officials 
to access stored electronic communications more easily. 
D. New York’s Framework 
This Subpart lays out New York’s current eavesdropping 
framework.  Specifically, it discusses the procedures required under 
New York law in order to obtain both an eavesdropping warrant and 
a search warrant. 
New York’s eavesdropping statute, like many states’ statutes, is 
heavily influenced by the ECPA.  As a result, many of the 
requirements in New York mirror the requirements at the federal 
level.  Unlike the ECPA, however, New York’s framework does not 
consist of three separate statutes that mirror the Wiretap Act, the 
SCA and the Pen Register Act respectively.  Instead New York has 
two statutes that address eavesdropping.  One statute, in New York’s 
penal law, criminalizes the act of eavesdropping by private 
individuals.88  The second statute, in New York’s criminal procedure 
law, governs eavesdropping by state law enforcement officers.89  The 
latter statute, section 700 of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law 
(section 700) will be the primary focus of this Note. 
																																																																																																																																
 86. See Kerr, supra note 62, at 1223 tbl. 
 87. Email that is in electronic storage for more than 180 days can be accessed by 
either: (1) a subpoena with notice to the user, (2) a court order with notice to the 
user, or (3) a search warrant. See § 2703; see also Kerr, supra note 62, table on 1223. 
 88. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 250.00–.65 (McKinney 2013). 
 89. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 700.05–.70 (McKinney 2013). 
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Like the federal Wiretap Act, the statute requires officials to 
obtain an eavesdropping warrant90 or procure the consent of one of 
the parties to the communication91 to access communications covered 
by the statute.  However, New York does not contain a state statute 
that is the equivalent of the SCA.  Therefore, treatment of stored 
electronic communications in New York is often determined 
according to the SCA.92 
1. Obtaining an Eavesdropping Warrant in New York 
New York’s eavesdropping statute provides that law enforcement 
officials may intercept “a telephonic or telegraphic communication,”93 
“a conversation or discussion,”94 or “electronic communications”95 if 
the officials first obtain an eavesdropping warrant. 
To obtain an eavesdropping warrant under New York’s 
eavesdropping statute, the New York District Attorney, Attorney 
General, Deputy Attorney General, or anyone authorized to act on 
their behalf96 must first file an ex parte application with the court.97  
The application must contain the following: (1) a statement of the 
applicant’s identity and authority to make the application;98 (2) a 
statement of the facts that justify the use of the warrant;99 (3) a 
statement that the communications are not privileged; (4) a statement 
																																																																																																																																
 90. See id. § 700.15. 
 91. See id. § 700.05(3). 
 92. See e.g., People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 875–76 (Sup. Ct. 2013); People 
v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 594–96 (Crim. Ct. 2012). 
 93. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(3).  This term is the equivalent of the term 
contained in the federal framework before being amended by the USA Patriot Act.  
The Patriot Act changed the term to “wire communication” to exclude voicemail 
messages from the Wiretap Act’s framework. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(5).  This limitation is required under federal law. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (2012). 
 97. The term “justice” is defined by section 700 as any justice of an appellate 
division, supreme court, or county court of the judicial department or county in which 
the eavesdropping warrant is to be executed. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(4). 
 98. Id. § 700.20(2)(a). 
 99. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(b) (“including (i) a statement of facts establishing 
probable cause to believe that a particular designated offense has been, is being, or is 
about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the 
facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted or the 
video surveillance is to be conducted, (iii) a particular description of the type of the 
communications sought to be intercepted or of the observations sought to be made, 
and (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing such designated offense and 
whose communications are to be intercepted or who is to be the subject of the video 
surveillance.”) 
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that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried; (5) a statement 
of the period of time for which surveillance is sought; and (6) a 
statement of any previous applications for surveillance of the same 
persons or places as are the subject of the current application.100  
These requirements are substantively identical to the showing 
required under federal law.101 
After an application102 is made to an authorized court,103 the judge 
has discretion to decide whether to grant or deny the application.104  
The judge will evaluate the application to determine if: (1) there is 
probable cause to believe that a particular person is committing, has 
committed, or is about to commit a designated offense;105 (2) there is 
probable cause to believe that particular communications concerning 
that offense will be obtained through eavesdropping;106 (3) there is 
probable cause to believe that the place where the communications 
are to be intercepted is being used, or is about to be used, in 
connection with the commission of a designated offense.107 
If the eavesdropping warrant issued is initially authorized to 
intercept communications as long as is necessary to achieve the 
objective of the authorization, it may not last longer than thirty 
days.108  The thirty-day period begins no later than ten days after the 
warrant issues.109  The warrant also contains a provision that requires 
																																																																																																																																
 100. CRIM. PROC. § 700.20(2)(c)–(f). 
 101. The ECPA requires law enforcement to make the same showing. See United 
States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425, 453–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (setting out the 
requirements for obtaining an eavesdropping warrant under federal law); People v. 
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. 2011) (“[I]t was the Legislature’s intention to 
conform state standards for court-authorized eavesdropping warrants with federal 
standards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare CRIM. PROC. § 700.20, with 
18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012). 
 102. In an emergency situation where imminent danger of death or serious injury 
exists, the statute does not require a written application but allows for an oral or 
electronic communication with an authorized justice. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
700.21(1) (McKinney 2013). 
 103. See supra note 97, discussing authorized courts. 
 104. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.25 (McKinney 2013).  In determining 
whether or not an application should have been granted, appellate courts typically 
defer to the discretion of the issuing justice. See e.g., People v. Baker, 577 N.E.2d 
1064 (N.Y. 1991) (denying appeal of judgment based on sufficiency of eavesdropping 
warrant); People v. Ianniello, 554 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1990). 
 105. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15(2) (MCKINNEY 2013). 
 106. CRIM. PROC. § 700.15(3). 
 107. CRIM. PROC. § 700.15(5). 
 108. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.10(2).  However, an applicant may file a request for an 
extension for an additional thirty days of surveillance. See id. § 700.40. 
 109. See CRIM. PROC. § 700.10(2). 
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surveillance be conducted in such a way as to minimize the 
interception of communications outside the scope of the 
surveillance.110 
2. Obtaining a Search Warrant Under New York Law 
Unlike the ECPA, New York’s eavesdropping law does not contain 
a separate framework for stored communications.  Instead, issuance 
of a search warrant is governed by section 690 of New York’s criminal 
procedure law.111 
The requirements for a search warrant differ from the higher 
requirements of an eavesdropping warrant in a few ways.  A search 
warrant simply requires probable cause, meaning that the government 
must present facts establishing a likelihood that a crime has occurred 
and that evidence of the crime exists in the location to be searched.112  
Compared to an eavesdropping warrant, a search warrant does not 
require a showing that: (1) the heightened particularity requirement is 
satisfied; (2) “normal investigative procedures” have been tried and 
failed; (3) the surveillance will be conducted in a way that minimizes 
the interception of irrelevant information; (4) there is probable cause 
to believe the interception will reveal evidence of one of a limited 
number of specific crimes.113 
II.  THE CONFLICT 
This Part explores the current conflict in New York between the 
explicit language of the eavesdropping statute and the recent 
interpretation of the statute by the courts.  Part II.A sets out the 
statutory language indicating that law enforcement in New York 
would need to obtain an eavesdropping warrant to compel disclosure 
of all electronic communications, regardless of whether or not they 
are in-transit or stored.  Part II.B examines recent decisions by the 
New York courts interpreting the definition of “intercepting” to mean 
accessing electronic communications that are in-transit, not those 
communications that have been received and stored.  Part II 
demonstrates that this conflict offers the New York legislature the 
chance to revise its statute to clarify the treatment of electronic 
communications under the state’s eavesdropping law. 
																																																																																																																																
 110. See id. § 700.30(9). 
 111. See id. §§ 690.05–.55. 
 112. See Kerr, supra note 27, at 620 tbl.; see also CRIM. PROC. § 690.35(3)(b); 
People v. Vanness, 965 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (App. Div. 2013). 
 113. See Simmons, supra note 31, at 553–54. 
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A. The Statute’s Plain Language 
New York’s eavesdropping statute114 states that if law enforcement 
agents wish to intercept a person’s private communications they must 
first obtain an eavesdropping warrant according to the procedure laid 
out in the statute.115  Specifically the statute defines “eavesdropping” 
to include “‘wiretapping’, ‘mechanical overhearing of conversation,’ 
or the ‘intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication’, as 
those terms are defined in section 250.00 of the penal law.”116  Section 
250.00 of the penal law defines each of those terms as follows: 
 “Wiretapping” means the intentional overhearing or recording of 
a telephonic or telegraphic communication by a person other than a 
sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of either the sender 
or receiver, by means of any instrument, device or equipment.117 
 “Mechanical overhearing of a conversation” means the 
intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or discussion, 
without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not 
present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment.118 
 “Intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication” and 
“intentionally intercepted or accessed” mean the intentional 
acquiring, receiving, collecting, overhearing, or recording of an 
electronic communication, without the consent of the sender or 
intended receiver thereof, by means of any instrument, device or 
equipment . . . .119 
Therefore, the statute prohibits three types of “eavesdropping”: (1) 
wiretapping a telephone or telegraphic communication; (2) bugging 
or recording an in-person conversation; and (3) intercepting or 
accessing electronic communications.  The language in (3) prohibiting 
eavesdropping by intercepting or accessing electronic 
																																																																																																																																
 114. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05(3) (McKinney 2013) (defining 
“intercepted communication” as including, “(a) a telephonic or telegraphic 
communication which was intentionally overheard or recorded by a person other 
than the sender or receiver thereof, without the consent of the sender or receiver, by 
means of any instrument, device or equipment, or (b) a conversation or discussion 
which was intentionally overheard or recorded, without the consent of at least one 
party thereto, by a person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or 
equipment; or (c) an electronic communication which was intentionally intercepted 
or accessed, as that term is defined in section 250.00 of the penal law”). 
 115. See supra Part I.D. 
 116. CRIM. PROC. § 700.05(1). 
 117. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00(1) (McKinney 2013). 
 118. PENAL § 250.00(2) 
 119. PENAL § 250.00(6). 
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communications is the key language that the courts have taken issue 
with, as discussed in Part II.B below. 
The statute prohibits “intercepting or accessing” an electronic 
communication.  The definition contains words like “acquiring, 
receiving, collecting” suggesting that it is not simply the 
contemporaneous interception of electronic communications while 
they travel from sender to recipient that is prohibited but also the 
accessing of such communications after they have been received.  
Therefore, the language of the New York eavesdropping framework 
fails to make the distinction between electronic communications that 
are stored and those that are in-transit.120  Instead, the language 
indicates that law enforcement access to any type of electronic 
communication requires an eavesdropping warrant.  However, courts 
interpreting the statute have determined that the statute does in fact 
only apply to those communications that are in-transit, despite the 
statute’s plain language.121 
B. The Courts’ Interpretation 
Few cases have interpreted the language of New York’s 
eavesdropping law.  In fact, the case law is silent as to whether or not 
law enforcement officials must procure an eavesdropping warrant to 
gain access to stored electronic communications.122  However, New 
																																																																																																																																
 120. Significantly, the ECPA simply uses the term “intercept” rather than New 
York’s “intercepting or accessing electronic communications.”  This departure from 
the federal language suggests that the New York legislature, in drafting the statute in 
the shadow of the ECPA, made a conscious decision to depart from the federal 
framework. 
 121. See Gurevich v. Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Boudakian v. 
Boudakian, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Moore v. Moore, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 
14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 122. New York courts have heard similar inquiries.  For example, in People v. 
Harris, the question was whether or not the government can compel Twitter to turn 
over the records of a user’s tweets. 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Crim. Ct. 2012).  In that case, 
the defendant was charged with disorderly conduct after marching on the Brooklyn 
Bridge. See id. at 592.  The prosecution sent a subpoena to Twitter seeking the 
defendant’s account information and relevant tweets. See id.  The defendant moved 
to quash the subpoena but the court ruled against him, issuing a court order on 
Twitter for the information’s disclosure.  Twitter then moved to quash the court 
order. See id.  The court held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect the 
defendant’s tweets because the defendant intentionally broadcasted them to the 
public. See id. at 595.  The court was careful to distinguish this case from a case 
concerning email or text messaging stating that this case “deals with tweets that were 
publicly posted rather than an e-mail or text that would be directed to a single person 
or a select few.” Id. at 590.  Similarly, New York courts have also considered the 
question of whether government access to cell site location data without a search 
warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 
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York’s lower courts have recently been faced with interpreting the 
statute in the context of matrimonial actions.123  In each of these cases, 
a spouse accessed his or her estranged spouse’s stored emails and 
subsequently sought to have them admitted into evidence.  The key 
inquiry in these cases is whether the spouse’s actions constituted a 
violation of New York’s eavesdropping statute.  If the spouse’s 
actions are a violation of the statute, then the emails are inadmissible 
evidence. 
For example, in Moore v. Moore,124 a wife discovered a laptop in 
the trunk of her estranged husband’s car from which she downloaded 
Internet messages that she wished to use as evidence in their divorce 
proceeding.125  The husband filed a motion to suppress and argued the 
disk was obtained through violation of New York’s eavesdropping 
statute and was therefore inadmissible.126  The court rejected this 
argument and found that accessing files downloaded and saved to a 
computer did not constitute “intercepting or accessing” a 
communication in violation of Penal Law § 250.05.127 
Similarly, in another divorce proceeding, Boudakian v. 
Boudakian,128 which was decided a few months after Moore, a wife 
downloaded communications from her estranged husband’s computer 
at their home.129  The court, following Moore, also held that the wife 
did not violate New York’s eavesdropping statute because the 
communications were not in-transit when she accessed them.130 
The most recent and in-depth discussion of New York’s 
eavesdropping statute was in Gurevich v. Gurevich.131  Gurevich was a 
matrimonial action where the wife gained access to her estranged 
husband’s email account and purported to use those emails to 
demonstrate that her husband was shielding income from her.132  The 
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 124. N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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 131. Gurevich v. Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009). 
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question was whether the emails were inadmissible under N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. § 4506,133 which provides: 
The contents of any overheard or recorded communication, 
conversation or discussion, or evidence derived therefrom, which 
has been obtained by conduct constituting the crime of 
eavesdropping, as defined by section 250.05 of the penal law may 
not be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or proceeding 
before any court . . . .134 
In other words, the court had to determine whether the wife 
violated the eavesdropping statute when she accessed her estranged 
husband’s stored emails.135  First, the court had to analyze the 
definitions set out in the eavesdropping law, including the definition 
for “intercept or access.”136 
The court concluded based on the statute’s legislative history137 that 
the purpose of the statute was to prohibit individuals from 
intercepting communications that were in-transit.138  Therefore, the 
wife did not “intercept” her husband’s emails within the meaning of 
the eavesdropping statute, and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4506 did not prevent 
the emails’ admission into evidence.139  That is, the court concluded 
that despite the plain language of the statute, New York’s 
eavesdropping law mirrors federal law in that it applies only to those 
electronic communications that are in-transit and does not apply to 
those communications that are stored.140 
As these cases demonstrate, there is a conflict between the plain 
language of the eavesdropping statute and the courts’ recent 
interpretation.  The plain language indicates that all electronic 
communications are covered by New York’s eavesdropping law, 
meaning law enforcement officials must obtain an eavesdropping 
warrant in order to intercept messages that are both in-transit and 
stored.  Nevertheless, New York courts have interpreted the statute 
to mirror the federal framework despite its language, meaning that 
communications that are in-transit require an eavesdropping warrant 
while those messages that have been received and/or are being stored 
do not.  This conflict begs the critical question, which interpretation is 
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correct?  This Note argues that the New York legislature should 
revise New York’s eavesdropping law to clarify the courts’ 
interpretation. 
III.  NEW YORK LAW SHOULD REQUIRE AN EAVESDROPPING 
WARRANT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT’S ACCESS TO ALL STORED 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
The conflict in New York between the plain language of the 
eavesdropping statute and New York courts’ interpretation of the 
statute creates the opportunity to revise and clarify that statute.  This 
Part proposes a revision to New York’s eavesdropping statute to 
exclude stored electronic communications.  It also proposes that New 
York enact a new law requiring law enforcement officials to procure a 
search warrant to gain access to stored electronic communications.141 
Part III.A argues that stored electronic communications should not 
be protected under New York’s eavesdropping statute.  This 
argument is rather simple and straightforward: there must be a 
balance between the risk to individual privacy rights and the interests 
of law enforcement counsel against requiring an eavesdropping 
warrant for stored electronic communications. 
Part III.B, however, makes the more contentious argument that 
stored electronic communications should require law enforcement 
officials to obtain a search warrant.  While the courts have largely 
shied away from the question—whether the Fourth Amendment 
protects stored electronic communications—an examination under 
the reasonable expectation test as set out in Katz dictates that a 
warrant should be required to access these communications.  This 
result, balanced against the interests of law enforcement, supports the 
conclusion that stored electronic communications should be protected 
by a warrant requirement in New York. 
A. Law Enforcement Access to Stored Communications in New 
York Should Not Require an Eavesdropping Warrant 
The weighing of individual privacy rights against law enforcement 
efficacy counsels against giving stored electronic communications 
heightened protection under New York’s law.  The degree of 
government intrusion upon individuals’ privacy does not warrant the 
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heightened protection of an eavesdropping warrant.  Moreover, 
requiring law enforcement officials to meet the heightened 
requirements for an eavesdropping warrant, given this lower risk, will 
impair their ability to investigate and prosecute crime. 
1. The Threat Posed to Individual Privacy Rights Is Not as Great 
for Stored Electronic Communications as it Is for in-Transit 
Electronic Communications 
The differing level of government intrusion between electronic 
communications that are in-transit and those that are stored supports 
treating the two types of communications differently.142  Intercepting 
electronic communications that are in-transit poses a much greater 
threat to personal privacy rights than interception of stored electronic 
communications.  Thus, in-transit electronic communications should 
be given greater protection. 
For example, if the government wishes to obtain copies of a stored 
electronic communication it must first procure the required warrant 
or court order according to the SCA and serve it on the service 
provider.143  Then the provider must turn over the requested 
communications.144  Therefore, accessing stored electronic 
communications is a one-time event.  By contrast, if the government 
instead seeks to intercept electronic communications en route from 
sender to receiver, they will have to install what is called a “sniffer 
device”145 which will monitor all communications traveling to and 
from a given account for a specified period of time.  In this way, 
intercepting in-transit electronic communications is an ongoing 
process more akin to wiretapping a phone line or bugging a residence. 
Accessing stored electronic communications via a compulsory 
order to service providers represents a lower intrusion upon 
individual privacy rights and thus should not require the same 
heightened level of protection as those communications that are in-
transit.  Wiretapping and other similar methods of intercepting 
communications while they are en route require law enforcement to 
make a higher showing upon the understanding that this continuous 
intrusion poses a great threat to personal privacy rights.146  The law 
allows the government to engage in these practices only when they 
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can satisfy the rigorous requirements for an eavesdropping warrant.  
By contrast, compelling service providers to turn over copies of stored 
electronic communications does not pose a continuous, extended 
threat to personal privacy.147  Instead, law enforcement must make a 
one-time application for an order and serve it on a service provider.148 
The lack of continuous intrusion inherent in law enforcement 
access to stored electronic communications counsels against requiring 
law enforcement to obtain an eavesdropping warrant under New 
York’s rigorous standards.  Additionally, this solution is supported by 
the disproportionate burden that this standard would place on law 
enforcement officials. 
2. Requiring an Eavesdropping Warrant for Access to Stored 
Electronic Communications Would Overburden Law Enforcement 
Officials 
Requiring law enforcement officials to obtain an eavesdropping 
warrant to compel disclosure of stored electronic communications 
would significantly impede New York officials’ criminal 
investigations.  The higher showing required to obtain an 
eavesdropping warrant could result in delaying access to important 
evidence and, in some circumstances, preventing access to these 
communications all together. 
For example, the category of courts authorized to issue an 
eavesdropping warrant is much narrower than those authorized to 
issue other court orders.  Only appellate division and superior court 
judges and justices can issue an eavesdropping warrant, as opposed to 
a search warrant, which can be issued by any local criminal court.149  
Additionally, the category of officials authorized to apply for an 
eavesdropping warrant is also much narrower than those officials that 
can apply for a search warrant.  Only high-level prosecutorial officials 
of the state may apply for an eavesdropping warrant150 while any 
public servant acting in the course of his official duties may apply for 
a search warrant.151  When applied to stored electronic 
communications these procedures could unduly delay government 
access to key evidence. 
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Additionally, the substantive requirements of an application for an 
eavesdropping warrant are much more strenuous.152  To obtain an 
eavesdropping warrant, an appropriate applicant as defined by the 
statute must file an application making the following showings: (1) a 
statement of the applicant’s identity and authority to make the 
application;153 (2) a statement of the facts that justify the use of the 
warrant;154 (3) a statement that the communications are not 
privileged;155 (4) a statement that normal investigative procedures 
have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to 
succeed if tried;156 (5) a statement of the period of time for which 
surveillance is sought;157 and (6) a statement of any previous 
applications for surveillance of the same persons or places as are the 
subject of the current application.158 
The second requirement for the application, the statement of facts 
that justify the use of the warrant, must include: 
(i) a statement of facts establishing probable cause to believe that a 
particular designated offense has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of 
the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to 
be intercepted or the video surveillance is to be conducted, (iii) a 
particular description of the type of the communications sought to 
be intercepted or of the observations sought to be made, and (iv) the 
identity of the person, if known, committing such designated offense 
and whose communications are to be intercepted or who is to be the 
subject of the video surveillance.159 
Requirements (ii) and (iii) above, implement the Fourth 
Amendment’s “particularity” requirement.160  Importantly, (iii) 
specifies that the applicant particularly describe the type of 
communication sought.  This means that law enforcement agents 
must include a description of the communication’s subject matter so 
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that they are not given a blank check to intercept all communications 
sent to a certain account. 
This showing is substantially higher than that required for 
obtaining a search warrant in New York.  In New York, the statement 
of facts justifying the search warrant must simply include a statement 
that there is probable cause for the search and that the item sought 
will be found in the place described.161 
Requiring government officials to make these heightened showings 
given the lower intrusion on individual privacy is inappropriate.  If 
New York requires its law enforcement officials to first obtain an 
eavesdropping warrant before they gain access to stored emails, there 
will necessarily be cases in which the crime charged is not listed as a 
specified crime under New York’s statute.162  Thus, for those cases, 
law enforcement officials will not be allowed to access a suspect’s 
stored electronic communications, even if they can satisfy all of the 
other rigorous requirements. 
Additionally, New York’s statute (like the federal framework) 
requires an applicant to demonstrate that normal investigative 
procedures have been tried and have failed.  In New York this 
requirement does not mean that the applicant needs to show that 
every other investigative technique has been exhausted,163 but it does 
require a showing that other techniques have been tried first or that 
other techniques would be ineffective.  This requirement was 
implemented as part of the Wiretap Act out of a concern that such an 
intrusive search should be a last resort.164  Access to stored electronic 
communications, however, does not represent the same continuous 
intrusion that wiretapping, bugging, or installing a sniffer device does.  
The law should not require that law enforcement officials exhaust 
other avenues first. 
Given the substantial burden that an eavesdropping warrant 
requirement would place on New York law enforcement and the 
lower threat to individual privacy rights under those circumstances, 
reinforcing the plain language of the statute and requiring an 
eavesdropping warrant for stored electronic communications would 
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be inappropriate.  Instead, a search warrant requirement would strike 
the right balance between the interests of law enforcement and the 
individual privacy interests. 
B. New York Should Enact a Warrant Requirement for Stored 
Electronic Communications 
This Part argues that New York should enact a warrant 
requirement for law enforcement access to stored electronic 
communications rather than await guidance from the courts or 
Congress.  This conclusion is supported by the application of the 
“reasonable expectations” test in Katz.  Moreover, a warrant 
requirement strikes the appropriate balance between law 
enforcement efficacy and personal privacy rights.  Finally, requiring a 
search warrant for stored electronic communications would eliminate 
the outdated distinctions made in the federal framework,165 providing 
clear guidance for all parties subject to the law. 
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Electronic 
Communications 
Any consideration of surveillance law requires an analysis under 
the Fourth Amendment.166  The Fourth Amendment requires that 
when an individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”167 in a 
certain space, or in this case in certain personal communications, the 
government must demonstrate probable cause and procure a search 
warrant before it may conduct any lawful search or seizure.168  
Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic 
communications in contemplating whether to implement a search 
warrant requirement. 
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In Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan set out a two-part test to 
determine whether the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement 
officials to procure a search warrant before a search or seizure.169  The 
first part asks whether the individual has an actual expectation of 
privacy in this space or property.  This inquiry is subjective.  The 
second part is an objective inquiry.  It asks whether that expectation is 
one that society finds reasonable.170  This Note asserts that individuals 
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic 
communications; thus, New York State should require law 
enforcement officials to procure a search warrant before accessing 
those communications. 
In supporting that argument, this Subpart first discusses why the 
third-party doctrine does not defeat the reasonable expectation test as 
applied to stored electronic communications.  Next, this Subpart 
applies the Katz test to electronic communications.  Specifically, it 
explores the extent to which the reliance upon and pervasiveness of 
electronic communications in today’s society supports the conclusion 
that society has an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
these communications. 
a. The Third-Party Doctrine Should Not Defeat Fourth 
Amendment Protection of Stored Electronic Communications 
The third-party doctrine is a central tenet of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The doctrine holds that when an individual surrenders 
an item (or in this case, a communication) to a third party, he forfeits 
all Fourth Amendment rights in that information or 
communication.171  In other words, the Supreme Court has found that 
a person cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information he relates to a third-party.172  The argument applying the 
third-party doctrine to stored electronic communications relies on the 
transmission through, and storage of, these messages with third-party 
service providers like ISPs and SMCs as discussed in Part I. 
However, the nature of electronic communications makes the 
application of the third-party doctrine to completely defeat Fourth 
Amendment protection of electronic communications 
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inappropriate.173  To begin, the third-party doctrine has traditionally 
been used to defeat protection of “business records.”174  In a series of 
cases, the Supreme Court has held that records of individuals’ 
transactions maintained by third-party business entities (like bank or 
tax records) are not protected under the Fourth Amendment.175  But 
electronic communications are nothing like business records; they are 
private communications.  Thus, applying the third-party doctrine to 
defeat Fourth Amendment protection of these communications 
would be inconsistent with the doctrine’s past application.176   The 
contents of business records are turned over with the understanding 
that the third party will need to review the contents of those records 
in the course of its business activities.  On the other hand, the use of 
web-based email or cellular text messaging services does not 
accompany the understanding that the service provider will need to 
access the communications content. 
The larger point, however, is that the third-party doctrine is simply 
not compatible with the methods of modern communication.  One of 
the rationales of the doctrine’s application has been that individuals 
have voluntarily assumed the risk that the third-party will disclose 
that information.177  In the context of stored electronic 
communications, however, it is very uncertain—in fact highly 
doubtful—that writing an email or composing a text-message means 
that a user is voluntarily assuming the risk that an ISP or cell phone 
service will turn the content of those messages over to the 
government.178 
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This point is reinforced by the fact that when the ECPA was passed 
in 1986, electronic communications worked much differently than 
they do today.  Communicating via email in the 1980s involved 
downloading email messages from a server to a home computer.179  If 
law enforcement officials wished to access those stored messages, 
they would have to access them through the individual’s home 
computer, which would require a search warrant.  Because this was 
the dominant email system at the time, the SCA’s distinctions were 
arguably drafted with this method in mind; in other words, almost all 
email systems were considered ECS providers—they would transmit 
the message from sender to receiver, storing the message 
intermediately along the way.180  Additionally, Congress created the 
category for RCS providers largely in light of the third-party doctrine.  
At the time, the services of third-party service providers that offered 
sophisticated remote storage were prohibitively expensive.181  Thus, 
remote storage was a service offered to large businesses that needed 
space to store their data.  In this way, the services of RCS providers in 
the 1980s resemble the “business records” cases. 
The distinction the SCA makes between ECS and RCS providers is 
not as clear now as it once was in 1986.  Today, web-based email 
providers like Gmail store all of their users’ messages in remote 
storage, and in intermediate storage during transmission.  In effect, 
large businesses are no longer the only users of remote storage.  
Instead most users of web-based email (and users of text-messages) 
have their messages stored in remote storage.182  Therefore, while 
application of the third-party doctrine may have comported with the 
doctrine’s past in 1986 when the ECPA was enacted, the advances in 
electronic communications technology since then casts serious doubt 
on its application to stored electronic communications today. 
Even Supreme Court justices have recently expressed disapproval 
of application of the third-party doctrine to modern technology.  In 
her concurrence in United States v. Jones,183 Justice Sotomayor 
stated, 
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[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premises that an individual 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.184 
For these reasons, the third-party doctrine should not defeat the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic 
communications. 
b. Society Has an Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in 
Stored Electronic Communications 
Under the two-prong test set out in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz, the compelled disclosure of stored electronic communications 
should require law enforcement officials to procure a search warrant.  
While the outcome under the subjective prong is case-dependent, the 
analysis under the test’s objective prong dictates that access to stored 
electronic communications should require a search warrant under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The subjective prong of the Katz test’s application is not 
predictable because it is necessarily a case specific inquiry, although 
most individuals, if asked whether they expect that strangers would 
read their email or text messages, would probably respond that they 
do not.  As to the second prong of the Katz test, in considering 
whether there is an objective expectation of privacy in stored 
electronic communications, a court must ask what society is entitled 
to believe, even if society might perceive a certain mode of 
communication as less than secure.185 
Under the objective inquiry set out in Katz, it is important to 
consider the growing role that electronic communications like text 
messages and email messages play in society today.186  One way to 
evaluate whether society has an objective expectation of privacy in 
stored electronic communications is through surveys. 
One recent study found that young adults are as likely to connect 
with others electronically as they are in person.187  This study shows 
that young adults today make a total of seventy-four electronic 
																																																																																																																																
 184. Id. at 957 (citations omitted). 
 185. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31, at 137–38. 
 186. See id. at 138–39. 
 187. See generally MILLER, supra note 10. 
1440 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLI 
contacts a month.188  The report compares the average electronic 
contacts by young adults to personal contact with individuals and 
concluded that the general trend is that young adults tend to 
communicate via electronic networks just as often as they do in 
person.189  This survey demonstrates that electronic communications 
like texts and emails are beginning to replace traditional modes of 
communications that already enjoy Fourth Amendment protection. 
Similarly, another 2011 study found that 83% of American adults 
own cell phones and 73% of them send and receive text messages.190  
Moreover, 31% of text message users stated that they preferred to be 
contacted via text messaging instead of talking on the phone.191 
Perhaps most importantly, another recent study found that 68% of 
adult Internet users say it is very important to them that no one, other 
than those authorized to, have access to the content of their email.192  
Additionally, the study found that 62% of adult Internet users say it is 
very important to them that only the people with whom they 
exchange emails have access to them.193  This survey demonstrates 
that despite the potential understanding that electronic 
communications are less secure, society still holds the belief that these 
communications should be private. 
These studies and statistics demonstrate the prevalence of and 
reliance on electronic communications in our modern world.  This 
factor is important in determining the objective inquiry of the 
“reasonable expectations” test because it demonstrates normative 
reliance on electronic communications showing that society is entitled 
to believe that these communications are private.194  This data is also 
significant in that it tends to demonstrate that email (and to a lesser 
extent text-messages) has replaced, to a certain degree, traditional 
communications that courts have already determined carry a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”195  The fact that electronic 
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communications have begun to replace these traditional forms of 
communication suggests that society holds a belief in privacy in 
electronic communications similar to the belief in the privacy of 
traditional modes of communication.196 
Under the Katz test, society has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in electronic communications and law enforcement access to 
these communications should at least require a search warrant.  This 
conclusion is supported by significant scholarship197 and at least one 
court decision.198 
2. Requiring a Search Warrant Will Not Over-Burden Law 
Enforcement Officials 
Requiring a search warrant under New York law for all stored 
electronic communications would make it more difficult for law 
enforcement to access certain types of stored electronic 
communications.  The current requirements are so weak, however, 
that a search warrant will not overburden law enforcement and would 
in fact be proportionate to the privacy interests at stake.  Under the 
current federal framework certain types of stored electronic 
communications only require a subpoena or court order for the 
government to access those communications.199  If New York 
eliminates this distinction and replaces it with a warrant requirement 
for all stored electronic communications, state law enforcement 
agents would have to make a greater showing than they once did to 
obtain stored electronic communications like emails and text 
messages.  The Department of Justice (DOJ), however, has recently 
made statements that disapprove of the effectiveness of the 
																																																																																																																																
U.S. 505, 510 (1961) (holding that the interception of telephonic and in-person 
conversations is a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 196. See generally Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 31. 
 197. See generally sources cited supra note 31. 
 198. The Sixth Circuit recently held that there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in emails and that government officials violate the Fourth Amendment when 
they obtain emails without first obtaining a search warrant. See United States v. 
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (2010). 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).  For example, emails and text-messages that have 
been “stored” for more than 180 days only require that the government obtain a 
subpoena to access them. § 2703(b). See ECPA (Part I): Lawful Access to Stored 
Content Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statements of 
Rep. Scott) (“[A] warrant is required to access the content of e-mails while it waits in 
electronic communications service storage to be read by the recipient, the instant the 
e-mail is opened by the recipient, it may lose that high standard of protection and 
become accessible by subpoena rather than by a warrant.”). 
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distinctions created under the SCA in the face of modern modes of 
communication.200  In fact, the DOJ has also admitted recently that 
the argument for requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause to compel disclosure of the contents of 
stored e-mails “has considerable merit.”201 
3. Requiring a Search Warrant for Access to Stored Electronic 
Communications Would Eliminate Confusion Over the Distinctions 
Contained in the SCA and Pressure Congress to Take Action 
Two additional benefits to a warrant requirement for stored 
electronic communications bear discussion.  First, requiring a search 
warrant for government access to stored electronic communications 
in New York would eliminate all of the confusion created by the 
SCA.  A blanket search warrant requirement would mean that both 
law enforcement officials and electronic communication users will 
have a clear understanding of the law.  The distinctions made as to 
how long a message has been in storage or what type of 
communication provider holds the message will no longer exist.  
Instead, the sole inquiry when government officials seek stored emails 
or texts from a service provider would be whether the government 
has demonstrated probable cause. 
While this clarity would certainly benefit the users of stored 
electronic communications, it may benefit service providers even 
more.202  Under the SCA, service providers are often placed in 
difficult positions.  They have the choice to either protect their users’ 
data (potentially facing obstruction of justice charges by refusing to 
cooperate with investigators), or cooperate with subpoenas and court 
orders and face losses to their business when users learn that their 
communications are not secure.  Since the SCA is an elaborate and 
confusing framework and the courts have provided little guidance, 
service providers often have to guess at which action will limit their 
																																																																																																																																
 200. In her testimony at the Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime, 
Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
Elana Tyrangiel, acting Assistant Attorney General, stated, “[The Department of 
Justice] agree[s], for example, that there is no principal basis to treat e-mail less than 
180 days old differently than e-mail more than 180 days old.” ECPA (Part I): Lawful 
Access to Stored Content Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland 
Security, & Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 14 (2013). 
 201. See id. 
 202. For more on the tech industry’s reaction to revelations of government 
surveillance, see Claire Cain Miller, Angry Over U.S. Surveillance, Tech Giants 
Bolster Defenses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/ 
technology/angry-over-us-surveillance-tech-giants-bolster-defenses.html?_r=1&. 
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losses. Under a search warrant requirement, ISPs and SMCs who 
provide services to users in New York would clearly understand those 
situations when disclosure is compelled and those situations where 
they must protect their users.  In other words, this clarity would allow 
service providers to predict outcomes and adjust their behavior 
accordingly. 
A blanket search warrant requirement would also allow the law to 
be more flexible and adapt to rapidly changing technologies.  The 
SCA drafters arguably drew on the technology that existed then to 
create the current surveillance framework.203  In effect, the SCA is full 
of distinctions that may have made sense at the law’s inception, but 
no longer fit in with today’s modern modes of electronic 
communication.  A search warrant requirement, devoid of any minute 
distinctions, would simply hold that government access to any and all 
stored electronic communications would require a search warrant.  As 
technology changes and evolves the question will become whether a 
given message is a “stored electronic communication.”  This question 
can be resolved by courts and will not require legislatures to revise 
the law every time that society advances. 
Finally, if New York implements a blanket search warrant 
requirement for government access to New Yorkers’ emails and text 
messages, it is possible that Congress would be pressured to do the 
same on the federal level.  New York may serve as an example of how 
such an amendment would work and perhaps relieve uncertainty for 
Congress.  Moreover, the more states that take action the harder it 
becomes for Congress to ignore.  Since the Snowden scandal, over 
two-dozen privacy laws have been passed in more than ten states.204  
These new laws range from laws limiting how schools can collect their 
student’s data to determining whether police must procure a warrant 
in order to use cell-site location data.205 
IV.  THE PROPOSED REVISION 
The difference between the plain language of the statute and the 
New York courts’ interpretation of the statute gives New York the 
perfect opportunity to clarify the law.  In addition, New York’s strong 
																																																																																																																																
 203. See supra Part I.B. 
 204. See Somni Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-
states-move-on-privacy-law.html. 
 205. See id. 
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history of protecting its citizens’ privacy206 makes it the optimal state 
to blaze the trail (along with Texas) in protecting Americans from 
government surveillance of their stored electronic communications. 
The following proposals would clarify that New York government 
officials do not need to obtain an eavesdropping warrant to access 
New Yorker’s stored electronic communications.  However, this Note 
also proposes changes that would require New York officials to 
obtain a search warrant upon a showing of probable cause in order to 
access these communications. 
A. Changes to the Language of New York Penal Law Section 
250.00 and New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 700.05 
The proposed revision to the New York eavesdropping law could 
be effected very easily.  New York’s penal law207 currently provides 
the definition of “intercepting or accessing of an electronic 
communication” as follows: 
 “Intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication” and 
“intentionally intercepted or accessed” means the intentional 
acquiring, receiving, collecting, overhearing, or recording of an 
electronic communication, without the consent of the sender or 
intended receiver thereof, by means of any instrument, device or 
equipment, except when used by a telephone company in the 
ordinary course of its business or when necessary to protect the 
rights or property of such company.”208 
The following represents the proposed changes that could be made 
to the language of the statute to give it the desired effect: 
 “Intercepting or accessing of an electronic communication” and 
“intentionally intercepted or accessed” means the intentional 
acquiring, receiving, collecting, overhearing, or recording of an 
electronic communication, while the communication is between 
the point of origin and the point of reception and without the 
																																																																																																																																
 206. New York courts have declined to implement doctrines in the field of search 
and seizure that have been adopted by other states because these doctrines intrude 
too greatly on personal privacy. See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993) 
(rejecting the “plain touch” doctrine for so-called Terry searches for weapons in part 
because the intrusion upon personal privacy is too great); see also People v. Torres, 
543 N.E.2d 61 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that police officers need more than reasonable 
suspicion to search the inside of a vehicle for weapons). 
 207. It is important to note that amending this definition in the penal law would 
also affect the criminal prohibition on eavesdropping, criminalizing only the 
interception of in-transit electronic communication under section 250 of the New 
York Penal Law. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2013). 
 208. PENAL LAW § 250.00(6). 
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consent of the sender or intended receiver thereof, by means of any 
instrument, device or equipment, except when used by a telephone 
company in the ordinary course of its business or when necessary to 
protect the rights or property of such company.” 
Additionally, the definition of “eavesdropping” contained in 
section 700.05 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law would also 
need to be revised slightly to make the two statutes compatible. The 
statute currently reads as follows: 
 “Eavesdropping” means “wiretapping”, “mechanical overhearing 
of conversation” or the “intercepting or accessing of an electronic 
communication” . . . . 
The following represents the changes to this definition: 
 “Eavesdropping” means “wiretapping”, “mechanical overhearing 
of conversation” or the “intercepting or accessing of an electronic 
communication” . . . . 
These revisions would put the proposed solution into effect, 
clarifying that New York’s eavesdropping law does not require an 
eavesdropping warrant for law enforcement access to stored 
electronic communications.  The statute’s language could also be 
revised in a few other minor respects are beyond the scope of this 
Note.209 
These revisions are not likely to be controversial.  No courts have 
held that stored electronic communications require an eavesdropping 
warrant.210  In fact, courts considering the question have found that 
																																																																																																																																
 209. This author would also recommend a few other alterations to the statute that 
would simply modernize the language to bring it up to speed with current technology. 
For example, one change that may be helpful would be to eliminate the term 
“telephonic or telegraphic communication” and replace it with the federal law 
equivalent, “wire communication.” Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.05 
(McKinney 2013), and PENAL LAW § 250.00(3), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2012).  In 
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be without practical effect.  If New York adopts the ECPA’s language here and 
replaces the term “telephonic or telegraphic communication” with “wire 
communication” that will mean that stored voicemail messages will be excluded from 
the eavesdropping statute as well.  This Note would argue that this exclusion is 
appropriate for all of the reasons why other stored electronic communications should 
be excluded from New York’s eavesdropping statute.  Therefore, the phrase “such 
term includes any electronic storage of such communications” contained in New 
York Penal Law section 250.00(3) should also be eliminated since that language is 
meant to expressly include voicemail in the definition of “telephonic 
communication.” 
 210. See supra Part II. 
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New York’s statute mirrors the federal law.211  In effect, this revision 
would simply bring New York’s statute into line with the Wiretap 
Act, clarifying that law enforcement officials are only required to 
obtain an eavesdropping warrant for in-transit communications.  It 
may seem from the language proposed to be omitted from the statute 
that the revision will take away certain protections, but in reality it 
will simply codify the law as it already exists in the courts. 
B. Proposed Statute Requiring a Search Warrant for Law 
Enforcement Access to Stored Electronic Communications 
In considering how to implement a warrant requirement in the 
state of New York, this Note has the advantage of a recent example.  
Texas Governor Rick Perry signed a bill requiring a search warrant 
for state law enforcement access to any and all stored email messages 
in the state of Texas on June 14, 2013.212  The new law213 revised 
various provisions of the criminal procedure code to implement the 
changes.214 Specifically, the bill revised Texas’s statute governing the 
issuance of search warrants to add the following language: 
(a) A search warrant may be issued to search for and seize: 
. . . 
(13) electronic customer data held in electronic storage, including 
the contents of and records and other information related to a wire 
communication or electronic communication held in electronic 
storage. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a)(13), “electronic communication,” 
“electronic storage,” and “wire communication” have the meaning 
assigned by Article 18.20, and “electronic customer data” has the 
meaning assigned by Article 18.21.215 
Additionally, the Texas legislature amended the definition of 
“electronic storage”216 to read: 
																																																																																																																																
 211. See generally People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Crim. Ct. 2012); Gurevich v. 
Gurevich, 886 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 2009); Boudakian v. Boudakian, N.Y. L.J. Dec. 
26, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008); Moore v. Moore, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 14, 2008 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
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BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=HB2268 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
See generally Sullivan, supra note 19. 
 213. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2013). 
 214. See H.B. 2268, 83rd Leg. (Tex. 2013).  Specifically, the bill revised articles 
18.02, 18.06–.07, and 18.20–.21 of Texas’s Code of Criminal Procedure. 
 215. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.02 (West 2013). 
 216. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20(20) (West 2013). 
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 “Electronic storage” means any storage of electronic customer 
data in a computer, computer network, or computer system, 
regardless of whether the data is subject to recall, further 
manipulation, deletion or transmission and includes any storage of a 
wire or electronic communication by an electronic communications 
service or a remote computing service.217 
The effects of these changes is to make clear that a search warrant 
is required for government access to any and all stored electronic 
communications.218  The changes to the definition of “electronic 
storage” would clarify that a search warrant is required regardless of 
whether or not the message is being temporarily stored or 
permanently stored and regardless of whether the message is stored 
with an ECS or an RCS.  In so doing, Texas has eliminated the 
distinctions created under the SCA.  In Texas, law enforcement 
officials are required to obtain a search warrant for messages that are 
temporarily stored on their way to the recipient.  Law enforcement 
will also need a warrant to access unopened emails and text messages.  
Texas government officials are even required to obtain a warrant 
before reading messages that have been read and remain in storage 
with service providers’ servers for long periods of time. 
Texas also included a provision stating that a search warrant for 
electronic communications could be issued regardless of where the 
customer data was held, whether it was within Texas or another 
state.219 
Similarly, the New York legislature could also revise the law to 
make it clear that a warrant is required for the search of stored 
electronic communications.  But revising New York’s law may require 
more extensive amendments.  For example, the term “electronic 
storage” does not appear at all in section 700 of New York’s criminal 
procedure law and while the term appears in section 250 of the penal 
law, it is not defined.220  Therefore, simply adding “access to stored 
electronic communications” to the list of evidence that require search 
warrants would not be sufficient since under New York’s current law 
																																																																																																																																
 217. Id. 
 218. In Texas, stored electronic communications also include stored voicemail 
messages. Therefore, for access to these stored voicemail messages, law enforcement 
officials must obtain a search warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
18.20(20) (including in the definition of “electronic storage” “storage of a 
wire . . . communication by an electronic communications service or a remote 
computing service.”) 
 219. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.21(5)(a). 
 220. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (McKinney 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
700.05 (McKinney 2013). 
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it is unclear what stored electronic communications are.  Regardless 
of how the amendment to New York law is formed, a definition of 
“electronic storage” in section 250, section 700 or elsewhere is 
necessary. 
Notice is another issue to consider.  Recently, California’s 
legislature approved a bill221 that was very similar to Texas’s 
amendment.  It would have required law enforcement officials in 
California to obtain a search warrant prior to accessing stored 
electronic communications like emails and text messages.222  Unlike 
Texas, California’s bill would have required state law enforcement to 
notify email account holders that a search of their account had taken 
place.223  Due to these heightened notice requirements, California 
Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill.224  Under the SCA, one 
advantage to law enforcement officials is that if they obtain a search 
warrant for access to stored electronic communications, they do not 
have to notify the suspect.225  Requiring that law enforcement officials 
first obtain a search warrant and then notify the suspect would 
perhaps overburden them, disrupting the balance struck by a warrant 
requirement.  In considering a revision to its surveillance statute, the 
New York legislature should assess whether a notice requirement 
would tip the scale too far in favor of personal privacy interests and 
too far against government interests. 
Overall, a blanket search warrant requirement would solve many 
of the problems and eliminate much of the inherent confusion under 
New York’s current domestic surveillance law.  While an amendment 
would not protect New Yorkers from surveillance by federal 
officials,226 it would ensure that New Yorkers’ emails and text 
messages are not accessed without probable cause by state law 
enforcement officials and may have the added bonus of providing 
pressure on Congress to take action. 
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CONCLUSION 
Americans have outgrown the nation’s surveillance laws.  The 
current federal framework does not adequately protect electronic 
messages in light of the growing prevalence of these modes 
communication.  Change is necessary.  Given the delay in legislation 
at the federal level, states should take action to protect their citizens. 
The current conflict between the plain language of the eavesdropping 
statute in New York and the recent interpretations of that statute by 
the courts presents the New York legislature with the opportunity to 
amend its statute and provide its citizens with greater protection from 
government surveillance.  In so doing, New York will not only afford 
its citizens better protection from state government surveillance but 
will also apply pressure to lawmakers on the federal level. 
Excluding stored electronic communications from New York’s 
surveillance statute and implementing a search warrant requirement 
for these communications strikes the appropriate balance between 
individual privacy interests and law enforcement efficacy.  This 
amendment will ensure that the emails and text messages of innocent 
New Yorkers—like Amy, Joe, and Michael, described above—will be 
safe from prying government eyes.  However, New York officials can 
still gain access to the emails and text messages of New Yorkers in the 
course of their investigations upon a showing of probable cause. 
